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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann, §78-2-2(3)(i) . This appeal is from summary judgments 
entered in the Third Judicial District in favor of two of five 
defendants named in plaintiff's Complaint, Two other defendants 
were voluntarily dismissed. A Default Judgment was entered in 
favor of plaintiff and against the fifth defendant. 
Specifically, judgments were granted in favor of defen-
dants National Housing and Finance Syndicate (National Housing) 
and Badi Mahmood (Mahmood), upon their respective motions for 
summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it found 
plaintiff's Motion For Leave to File Second Amended Complaint 
moot, after granting defendant National Housing's summary 
judgment motion. Stated otherwise, the issue is whether the 
trial court should have ruled on the Motion for Leave to File 
Second Amended Complaint before ruling on the summary judgment 
-1-
motion. 
2. Whether application of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3), 
the statute of limitations applicable to actions "for relief on 
the ground of fraud or mistake", barred plaintiff's action. 
3. Whether Mahmood, based on his past business rela-
tionship with plaintiff and in view of the fact that he recom-
mended that plaintiff retain Dennis Jackman to appraise the 
property it was considering purchasing from National Housing, 
owed a duty to plaintiff to disclose (a) the fact that he was 
going to share in National Housing's profit on the sale, (b) that 
he had provided Jackman with "comparable sales" data used in the 
appraisal, (c) that he controlled the brokerage which acted as 
National Housing's agent, and (d) that National Housing had pur-
chased the property just days earlier for one-third the price 
plaintiff was about to pay. 
4. Whether Mahmood, based on his capacity as a real 
estate broker, owed a duty to plaintiff to make those same 
disclosures. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11. Revocation or suspension of 
license—Grounds.1 
1As it read from 1963 until 1983. 
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"The board or the commission . . . may suspend or revoke 
any license issued under the provisions of this chapter at 
any time where the licensee has by false or fraudulent repre-
sentation obtained a license, or where the licensee in per-
forming or attempting to perform any of the acts mentioned in 
this chapter is found to be guilty of: 
"(1) Making any substantial misrepresentation; or, 
"(11) Failing to disclose, in the purchase of property 
in the name of a broker or salesman, whether the purchase is 
made for himself or itself or for an undisclosed principal. 
"(12) Any other conduct whether of a similar or of a 
different character from that hereinbefore specified which 
constitutes dishonest dealing." 
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-17. Penalty for violation of 
chapter.2 
"(b) In case any person . . . shall have received any 
sum of money or the equivalent thereto, as commission, com-
pensation or profit by or in consequence of his violation, of 
any provision of this act, such person . . . shall also be 
liable to a penalty of not less than the amount of the sum of 
money so received and not more than three times the sum so 
received, as may be determined by the court, which penalty 
may be sued for and recovered by any person aggrieved and for 
his use and benefit, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1. Time for commencement of 
actions generally. 
"Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limita-
tion is prescribed by statute." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26 [subdivision (3)]. Within 
three years. 
2As it read from 1951 until 1983. 
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"Within three years: 
"(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action in such case 
does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE3 
On December 31, 1979, defendant National Housing and 
Finance Syndicate purchased approximately 46 acres of unimproved 
land from Golden Hills Land Corporation for $320,000.00. (R. 
23 3) Golden Hills had purchased the property from Dorothy Kitt 
on the same day it sold the property to National Housing. (R. 
231) 
Just two days later, on January 2, 1980, National 
Housing sold the same 46 acres of unimproved land to plaintiff 
for $927,800.00. (R. 229-230) Associated Title Company acted as 
escrow agent. 
Plaintiff was first shown the property by defendant 
Mahmood who had close connections with plaintiff. (R. 239-240) 
[He had performed numerous real property appraisals for plaintiff 
3One of plaintiff's contentions is that the trial court erred 
in not hearing and deciding plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File 
A Second Amended Complaint. Some of the facts discussed in the 
following recitation of facts are not supported by the record but 
are facts plaintiff believes it could have proven had it been 
permitted to further amend its Complaint and complete discovery 
before hearing on respondents1 summary judgment motions. Those 
facts are indicated by closed brackets, thus: []. 
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in the past.] Prior to purchasing the property, plaintiff 
retained Dale Jackman to appraise the property. Jackman was rec-
ommended to plaintiff by defendant Mahmood and Mahmood provided 
"market data" in his file to Jackman for use in preparing the 
appraisal. (R. 245) 
The real estate broker for National Housing on the sale 
to plaintiff was Bara Investment Associates. (R. 238) Mahmood 
was the principal broker for Bara Investment Associates. 
(R. 237) At time of closing on the sale from National Housing to 
plaintiff, Bara received a sales commission of $4,588.00. 
(R. 229) Additionally, National Housing gave Mahmood 40% of the 
profit realized by it on the sale, approximately $200,000.00. 
(R. 242) In turn, Mahmood gave one-half of what he received to 
Galen Ross, an officer of National Housing. (R. 24 3) 
[Despite the fact that he knew plaintiff had frequently 
relied on him in the past to appraise properties, Mahmood did not 
disclose to plaintiff the closely contemporaneous sales of the 
property; nor that National Housing had purchased the property 
just two days earlier for one-third the sales price. Nor did 
Mahmood disclose to plaintiff that he had the controlling inter-
est in the broker who represented National Housing. Nor did 
Mahmood disclose to plaintiff that he had an "interest" in the 
property by virtue of the fact that he was going to share in 
National Housing's profits.] 
It was not until at least January 1984 that plaintiff, 
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for the first time, became aware of any relationship between 
Mahmood, real estate agent Irene Woodside, Bara Investment, and 
National Housing. (R. 249) At that time, William Chipman, an 
investment officer for plaintiff, received a telephone call from 
an appraiser named William Lang who told Mr. Chipman that the 
subject property had been involved in a double escrow and that 
there may have been an "irregularity" in the appraisal which 
plaintiff relied on in purchasing the property. Mr. Lang 
suggested that Mr. Chipman call Reed Jensen. (R. 249-251) 
Shortly thereafter—within a couple of days—Mr. Chipman 
did call Reed Jensen. Mr. Jensen told Chipman that he was 
involved in a lawsuit with Badi Mahmood, and confirmed that 
National Housing had purchased the subject property and almost 
immediately resold it to plaintiff at a much higher price, but 
was otherwise hesitant to talk to Chipman without first consult-
ing his attorney. 
Near the end of January, 1984, Chipman called Jensen 
back. Jensen told Chipman that his attorney, Richard Rappaport, 
had advised him not to turn over any documentation to Chipman 
until Jensen's lawsuit with Mahmood was concluded. Chipman then 
called Mr. Rappaport. Rappaport did not volunteer any 
information, but did suggest that when the lawsuit against 
Mahmood was concluded the transcript might provide material that 
plaintiff might "desire to have". (Chipman deposition, 27:20-
28:3) 
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Plaintiff obtained a copy of the transcript of proceed-
ings in the case of Badi Mahmood v. R. Reed Jensen and Golden 
Hills Land Corporation, Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 
C83-4217, in August and October, 1984. Based on testimony in 
those transcripts, plaintiff and counsel determined there had 
been what they believed to be fraudulent conduct on the part of 
defendants. Plaintiff filed its action on December 11, 1985, 
less than two years after the telephone call from Lang to Chipman 
first advising Chipman that there had been a double escrow and 
that the property had been sold to plaintiff for three times the 
price National Housing paid for it. 
Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 2-11) alleged generally that 
plaintiff purchased the subject property based on an appraisal 
which misrepresented the value of the property at a much higher 
value than its actual worth; that plaintiff did not know of the 
erroneous nature of the appraisal; and that defendants each knew 
that the property was worth much less than indicated by the 
appraisal relied upon by plaintiff. The Complaint also alleges 
that the defendants conspired among themselves to conceal the 
true value of the property from plaintiff. 
On April 11, 1986, plaintiff file an Amended Complaint 
(R. 80-91) which added four paragraphs alleging that plaintiff 
"did not discover the misrepresentation and had no opportunity to 
do so until sometime after January, 1984, when it began to be 
apprised of the underlying facts . . .." (Amended Complaint, 
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R. 80-91, II 23, 29, 37 and 45) 
On March 22, 1987, plaintiff settled with Dale Jackman 
and submitted an Order of Dismissal to the court dismissing 
Jackman from the action. 
On April 8, 1987, plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave 
to Pile A Second Amended Complaint (R. 155-156) and Proposed 
Second Amended Complaint. (R. 157-170) The Proposed Second 
Amended Complaint added a new cause of action entitled Construct-
ive Fraud (R. 166-169) alleging that defendants Mahmood, Irene 
Woodside, and National Housing failed to disclose their true 
relationship with each other when they knew a conflict of inter-
est existed; that Mahmood failed to disclose that he had a con-
trolling interest in Bara Investment; that Mahmood failed to 
disclose that he had provided the appraiser, Dale Jackman, with 
the real estate comparables used in the misleading appraisal 
report; that Mahmood failed to disclose that the property had 
been purchased just days earlier for one-third the value at which 
Jackman appraised it; the double closing had not been disclosed 
to plaintiff; and that Mahmood failed to disclose his own finan-
cial interest in the sale to plaintiff. The proposed new cause 
of action alleged that defendants knew that if plaintiff had 
known of the facts which they failed to disclose, those facts 
would have materially effected plaintiff's determination to pur-
chase the property, and that Mahmood's failures to disclose mate-
rial facts breached a duty owed to plaintiff pursuant to Utah 
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Code Ann. 61-2-11. Plaintiff noticed its Motion for Leave to 
File a Second Amended Complaint for hearing on April 27, 1987. 
(R. 153) 
On April 17, 1987, National Housing filed a memorandum 
in opposition to plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File A Second 
Amended Complaint (R. 172-176) and moved the court for summary 
judgment in its favor. (R. 177-178) National Housing noticed 
the summary judgment motion for hearing on April 27, the same day 
as plaintiff's motion for leave to amend was set for hearing. 
(R. 193) 
The two motions were both argued on April 17, 1987, and 
were taken under advisement. (R. 196) Thereafter, with the 
trial court's permission, National Housing filed a Post Argument 
Memorandum on Summary Judgment (R. 197-198), and plaintiff filed 
a Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion For Leave to File A Second Amended Complaint (R. 201-206) 
and a Reply Memorandum in Opposition to [National Housing's] 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 211-251). Each of those memo-
randa were filed with the court by May 1, 1987. 
By minute order dated May 13, 1987 (R. 269), the court 
granted National Housing's summary judgment motion and, in light 
of its ruling granting summary judgment, found plaintiff's Motion 
for Leave to File A Second Amended Complaint moot. The minute 
order states that the summary judgment motion "is granted for the 
reasons and upon the grounds advanced, however most specifically 
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on the ground that plaintiff relied on the appraisal of Mr, 
Jackman who has been dismissed as a defendant." 
Summary Judgment was entered in favor of National 
Housing on June 8, 1987. (R. 270-271) Based on the trial 
court's rulings as set forth in the May 13, 1987, minute order, 
plaintiff and defendant Mahmood stipulated (R. 274-275) that his 
summary judgment motion could be granted.4 Therefore, an order 
granting judgment for Mahmood was entered on July 1, 1987. (R. 
272-273) 
A default judgment was entered against the last remain-
ing defendant, Irene Woodside, on September 23, 1987 
(R. 294-295), and plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on October 
5, 1987. (R. 296-299) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While it is surely within the trial court's discretion 
whether to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend a complaint, 
such motions should be freely granted when justice so requires. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985). In the instant 
case, plaintiff filed its motion for leave to file a Second 
Amended Complaint on April 8, 1987. Only thereafter, on April 
4
 Mahmood served a summary judgment motion on plaintiff, incorpo-
rating National Housing's arguments. The motion was apparently 
never filed with the trial court [See Addendum]. 
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17, 1987, did defendant National Housing file a motion for sum-
mary judgment. The trial court erred when it failed to rule on 
plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, but instead found the 
motion moot because it was granting National Housing's summary 
judgment motion. 
The proposed Second Amended Complaint set forth a theory 
of recovery against defendants Mahmood and National Housing not 
encompassed within the Amended Complaint. National Housing's 
summary judgment motion did not present evidence sufficient to 
eliminate each triable issue of material fact under the theory 
set forth in the Sixth Cause of Action of plaintiff's proposed 
Second Amended Complaint. (R. 166-169) Plaintiff alleged in the 
proposed Sixth Cause of Action that despite the appraisal work 
Mahmood had performed for plaintiff in the past, resulting in a 
relationship of trust and confidence between them, Mahmood failed 
to advise plaintiff that he had a monetary interest in National 
Housing's profit on the sale of the subject property, failed to 
advise plaintiff that he controlled the brokerage firm handling 
the sale, failed to advise plaintiff that he had provided the 
comparable sales data to the appraiser who appraised the property 
for plaintiff, and failed to tell plaintiff that the true value 
of the property was much less than the appraised value. 
Plaintiff contends that Mahmood's failure to advise it 
of those material facts gave rise to a cause of action for that 
species of constructive fraud known as misrepresentation by 
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omission, Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 
1980), and also gave rise to a cause of action against Mahmood 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-11(1) or (12) and 61-2-17, as 
those statutes read at the time of the sale of the property. 
Since plaintiff's motion for leave to amend was filed 
before National Housing's summary judgment motion, plaintiff was 
entitled to a ruling on its motion for leave to amend, either 
granting or denying the motion, before ruling on the summary 
judgment motion. 
Plaintiff also contends that the finding by the trial 
court set forth in its May 13, 1987, minute order (R.269) upon 
which it based its order granting National Housing's summary 
judgment motion—that "[plaintiff] relied on the appraisal of Mr. 
Jackman who has been dismissed as a defendant"—is, even assuming 
that to be a true and undisputed fact, an insufficient basis upon 
which to grant summary judgment. Assuming as fact that Mr. 
Jackman did not submit a fraudulent appraisal does not preclude a 
finding that Mahmood and National Housing conspired to defraud 
plaintiff by providing Jackman with inaccurate or misleading 
"comparable sales" data. Nor does that fact preclude a finding 
that Mahmood breached a duty to make a full disclosure to plain-
tiff of his relationship with National Housing and his financial 
interest in National Housing's profit on the sale. Nor does the 
fact that plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Jackman raise any pre-
sumption that either he or any other defendant did not engage in 
-12-
tortious conduct. 
Finally, plaintiff submits that the statute of 
limitations on its claims did not begin to run until at least 
January, 1984, when plaintiff's employee William Chipman was 
first advised that there may have been an irregularity in the 
appraisal upon which plaintiff relied in going through with the 
purchase of the subject property. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) 
provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT RULE ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
BEFORE RULING ON NATIONAL HOUSING'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
Plaintiff filed its Motion for Leave to File a Second 
Amended Complaint (R. 155) on April 8, 1987. At that time there 
were no other motions pending before the court. The case had not 
been set for trial and a Certificate of Readiness had not been 
filed. The record does not reflect that either of the respondent 
defendants, National Housing and Badi Mahmood, had taken any 
action on the case since October, 1986, when attorneys for 
National Housing took the deposition of one of plaintiff's 
employees. Plaintiff noticed its motion for hearing on April 27, 
1987. (R. 153) 
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Nine days later, on April 17, 1987, National Housing 
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for leave to amend 
(R. 172) and a motion for summary judgment. (R. 177) National 
Housing noticed its summary judgment motion for hearing on April 
27, 1987 (R. 193), the same day as plaintiff's motion for leave 
to amend was scheduled for hearing. The memorandum in opposition 
to the motion for leave to amend set forth an argument to the 
effect that the motion should be denied because the proposed new 
cause of action failed on its face to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. National Housing's memorandum in 
support of its summary judgment motion did not address the 
proposed new cause of action, which plaintiff entitled 
"constructive fraud". 
The two motions were both argued on April 27, 1987, and 
taken under advisement by the trial court. (R. 196) After addi-
tional briefing by both sides, the trial court ruled as follows: 
"1. [Plaintiff's] motion to amend is denied as moot in 
light of the Courts following ruling. 
"2. Motion for Summary Judgment of [defendant] National 
Housing & Finance Syndicate is granted for the reasons and 
upon the grounds advanced; however most specifically on the 
ground that [plaintiff] relied on the appraisal of Mr. 
Jackman who has been dismissed as a defendant. . . . " 
(R. 269) 
Plaintiff was entitled to a ruling on its Motion For 
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint on the merits of the 
motion and proposed Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff does not 
contend for a rule that pending motions must, without exception, 
-14-
be considered and ruled upon in the order they are filed. 
However, in the instant case the proposed Second Amended 
Complaint set forth a theory of recovery against defendants 
Mahmood and National Housing not encompassed within the Amended 
Complaint upon which the court granted summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, so far as it related to 
National Housing and Mahmood, alleged generally that Mahmood knew 
that the true value of the subject property was $320,000 but rep-
resented to plaintiff that the property had a value greater than 
plaintiff was about to pay (R. 80, Amended Complaint, Second 
Cause of Action); that National Housing made the same representa-
tion (Third Cause of Action); and that Mahmood and National 
Housing conspired to defraud plaintiff by misrepresenting the 
value of the property (Fifth Cause of Action). 
In the course of discovery it became apparent that 
plaintiff would not be able to prove any express misrepresenta-
tions by defendants Mahmood or National Housing as to the value 
of the property. Nevertheless, in view of what plaintiff per-
ceived to be a close relationship between its investment officers 
and Mahmood based on real estate appraisal work performed for 
plaintiff in the past by Mahmood, counsel concluded that Mahmood 
had a professional duty as a real estate broker to disclose to 
plaintiff that the property was worth substantially less than 
plaintiff was about to pay for it. Therefore, plaintiff moved 
for leave to file a second amended complaint to allege a cause of 
-15-
action for fraudulent concealment of material facts and for 
breach of the duty of a licensed real estate broker as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11. 
The merits of plaintiff's proposed new cause of action 
are discussed in some detail later in this Argument. It should 
suffice at this juncture to point out that if plaintiff's motion 
for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint had been granted, 
plaintiff would not have carried the burden of showing reliance 
on an express misrepresentation of material fact. A substantial 
part of National Housing's summary judgment motion was based on 
its Statement of Material Fact, found at R. 182, that "The only 
representations relied upon by the Board in making its decision 
to purchase the land in question were those contained in Dale 
Jackman's appraisal", and its argument that, "Since Mr. Jackman's 
appraisal was the only representation of value the Board relied 
on in purchasing the subject land, the claims asserted in this 
case fail at the threshold." (R. 184) 
Because proof of the new proposed cause of action did 
not require evidence of an express misrepresentation, the trial 
court should have ruled on the merits of plaintiff's motion for 
leave to amend. 
B. 
HAD THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOT 
TO GRANT THE MOTION 
Leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when 
justice so requires." Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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While it is certainly true that it is within the court's discre-
tion whether to grant leave to amend a complaint, Stratford v. 
Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984), in absence of evidence of 
prejudice to the defendant or unless the proposed amendment will 
delay trial, liberal application of Rule 15(a) requires that 
leave be granted. See, e.g., Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 
248 (Utah 1983); Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prod-
ucts, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 450 (1973); Gillman v. 
Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046-1047 (1971). 
A prime consideration in determining whether an amend-
ment should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity to 
meet the newly raised matter. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 
(Utah 1981). In the instant case, National Housing made no 
attempt to demonstrate that an order granting leave to further 
amend the complaint would result in prejudice to it. National 
Housing made no claim that the proposed Second Amended Complaint 
would require additional discovery although, as plaintiff pointed 
out to the trial court (R. 202), further discovery was 
contemplated. The case was not on the eve of trial—indeed, no 
trial date had yet been set. Therefore, defendants had plenty of 
opportunity to conduct discovery to prepare to meet the allega-
tions contained in the proposed new cause of action. The pro-
posed new cause of action certainly arose from the same "conduct, 
transaction or occurrence" as alleged in the prior complaint. 
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The only ground propounded by National Housing in support of 
its argument that the motion for leave to amend should be denied 
was that the proposed new cause of action did not state a claim 
upon which relief could be based. As is discussed below, 
plaintiff submits that National Housing was wrong. 
C. 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF ITS SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT 
CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The tort of concealment is a species of constructive 
fraud. As stated in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1369 (Utah 1980) : 
"A finding of fraud requires a showing of a false 
representation of an existing material fact, made knowingly 
or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon 
upon which plaintiff reasonably relies to his detriment. 
Misrepresentation may be made . . . by material omission, 
where there exists a duty to speak." (610 P.2d at 1373) 
(emphasis added) 
The proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges (or could 
have been easily further amended to allege): 
a. Badi Mahmood had a lengthy business relationship 
with plaintiff in that he had performed numerous real prop-
erty appraisals for plaintiff in the past; 
b. Mahmood was the principal broker for Bara 
Investment Corporation; 
c. Bara acted as the broker/agent for National Housing 
in the sale of the subject property to plaintiff; 
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d. Mahmood also had a business interest in National 
Housing, had a pecuniary interest in the sale, and in fact 
received at least $100,000 of National Housing's profits from 
the sale of the property to plaintiff; 
e. Mahmood knew the property had been sold to National 
Housing for $320,000 just a few days before National Housing 
sold the property to plaintiff for $927,000; 
f. Mahmood knew the fair market value of the property 
was substantially less than $927,000; 
g. Mahmood recommended that plaintiff retain Dale 
Jackman to appraise the property, and then provided Jackman 
with comparable sales data used by Jackman in the appraisal 
report. Mahmood knew that use of the comparable sales data 
would result in appraisal at a value higher than the actual 
value. 
h. Plaintiff did not know, and Mahmood failed to dis-
close to plaintiff, that Mahmood controlled Bara Investments, 
that he was going to personally take a percentage of National 
Housing's profits, and that he knew the property was worth 
substantially less than $927,000; 
i. Mahmood owed a duty to plaintiff, pursuant to Utah 
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Code Ann. § 61-2-11(12)5 to disclose his own financial 
interest in the sale of the property; and 
j. Because of his prior business relationship with 
plaintiff, Mahmood knew that if he had disclosed his interest 
in the sale of the property to plaintiff, plaintiff would 
have had the opportunity to ask him whether he believed the 
price was reasonable, and whether he concurred with Dale 
Jackman's appraisal of the property, in which case Mahmood 
would have had a legal duty to speak the truth; and plaintiff 
would have had the opportunity to obtain a second appraisal 
from an appraiser not recommended by Mahmood. 
In Utah, the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to 
those dealing with a licensed real estate agent or broker, such 
as Mahmood. In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980), 
this court stated: 
"A real estate agent, however, does not occupy the posi-
tion of lay vendor of property. An agent is licensed by the 
state and is required to meet standards of 'honesty, 
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and competency.1 [U.C.A. 
5U.C.A. §61-2-11 lists several acts which the legislature has 
determined constitute grounds for suspension or revocation of a 
real estate broker's or salesman's license. Subdivision (11), in 
1980 and presently, prohibits a broker or salesman from failing 
to disclose whether a purchase or sale is made for himself or for 
an undisclosed principal. Subdivision (12), as it read at the 
time of the sale from National Housing to plaintiff, made it pun-
ishable for a broker or salesman to engage in "Any other conduct 
whether of a similar or of a different character from that 
hereinbefore specified which constitutes dishonest dealing". 
Plaintiff submits that the conduct alleged is of a similar char-
acter to that conduct prohibited by §61-2-11(11). 
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61-2-6(a)] A real estate license may be revoked if the licen-
see is unable or unworthy to safeguard the interests of the 
public. 
" . . . Though not occupying a fiduciary relationship 
with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the 
vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and 
is answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory 
duty to the public." Idk_ at 1248. 
Quoting from 23 Am.Jur. 854, Fraud and Deceit, IV 
Concealment, Sections 78 and 80, in Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 
379, 384 P.2d 802, 804-805 (1963), this court stated: 
"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must 
relate to a material matter known to the party and which it 
is his legal duty to communicate to the other contracting 
party, whether the duty arises from a relationship of trust, 
from confidence, inequality of condition and knowledge, or 
other attendant circumstances . . . . 
"The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it 
relates to nondisclosure that a charge of fraud is maintain-
able where a party who knows material facts is under a duty, 
under the circumstances, to speak and disclose his informa-
tion, but remains silent. 
"Although the pertinent inquiry in any case where fraud 
on the basis of nondisclosure is asserted is whether, upon 
any particular occasion, it was the duty of the person to 
speak on pain of being guilty of a fraud by reason of his 
silence, except in broad terms the law does not attempt to 
define the occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the 
contrary, there has been adopted as a leading principle, the 
proposition that whether a duty to speak exists is determin-
able by reference to all the circumstances of the case and by 
comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end in 
view by the contracting parties. . . . 
"Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated trans-
action is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain facts 
is a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is 
owing. There is much authority to the effect that if one 
party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or 
knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach 
of the other party and which he could not discover by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge which 
are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obli-
gation to speak, especially when the other party relies upon 
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him to communicate to him the true state of facts to enable 
him to judge of the expediency of the bargain." 
In the instant case, the "circumstances" upon which a 
duty to speak must be determined are those set forth above. By 
reason of his controlling interest in Bara Investment Company 
Mahmood was, unbeknownst to plaintiff, an agent for National 
Housing. Not only did Mahmoodfs ongoing business relationship 
with plaintiff give rise to a duty to divulge his interest in the 
sale, i.e., that he controlled the brokerage company which was 
going to receive a commission on the sale and was personally 
going to share in National Housing1s profit on the sale. Mahmood 
also had an statutory obligation as a real estate broker to 
divulge his interest in the sale. U.C.A. §61-2-11(12). If 
Mahmood had done so then plaintiff, based on Mahmoodfs past work 
as an appraiser for plaintiff, might have had the opportunity to 
inquire of Mahmood as to the reasonableness of the price it was 
going to pay for the property. If asked, Mahmood would have had 
a legal obligation to speak the truth. Because of Mahmoodfs 
failure to disclose his interest in both the commission and net 
profit, plaintiff never had that opportunity.6 
6
 It does not take much speculation to conclude that if plaintiff 
had known of Mahmoodfs interest in the property, it would have at 
least casually asked him what he thought of the price National 
Housing was asking. Nor does it take much speculation to con-
clude that if plaintiff had known of Mahmoodfs interest it would 
have obtained a second appraisal of the property by an appraiser 
not recommended by Mahmood, as was the case. 
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Plaintiff submits that proof of the facts alleged above, 
all of which are explicitly or inferentially found in the pro-
posed new cause of action of plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint, when coupled with Mahmood's ethical duty as set forth 
in U.C.A. §61-2-11(1), (11), and (12), would establish a case 
upon which the trier of fact could find constructive fraud. 
Whether a relationship between two parties is sufficiently 
"confidential" as to create a duty on the part of the defendant 
to come forward and disclose all the material facts to the 
plaintiff is a question of fact. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766, 769 (Utah 1985) . 
D. 
PLAINTIFF'S DISMISSAL OF DALE JACKMAN DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
A FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD ON THE PART OF 
DEFENDANTS MAHMOOD OR NATIONAL HOUSING 
As stated above, the trial court's minute order states 
that it granted National Housing's summary judgment motion "for 
the reasons and upon the grounds advanced [by National Housing]; 
however most specifically on the ground that [plaintiff] relied 
on the appraisal of Mr. Jackman who has been dismissed as a 
defendant." (R. 269) 
Plaintiff did indeed settle with and dismiss its claim 
against the appraiser, Dale Jackman, and in doing so it expressly 
reserved its claims against each of the other defendants. (R. 
150-151) However, the release of one joint tortfeasor does not 
discharge other joint tortfeasors when, as in this case, the 
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plaintiff has expressly reserved his rights. Utah Code Ann, 
15-4-4. The trial court erred when it let its decision to grant 
National Housing's summary judgment motion be influenced by the 
fact that plaintiff dismissed the appraiser who prepared the 
appraisal upon which plaintiff relied in purchasing the property 
at an inflated price. Even assuming that Dale Jackman was dis-
missed because plaintiff became convinced of his lack of 
culpability, that lack of culpability does not give rise to any 
presumption that defendants Mahmood and National Housing were not 
culpable. 
No evidence was presented by National Housing in support 
of its summary judgment that would preclude a finding that 
Jackman, whether himself culpable or not, served as a conduit for 
Mahmoodfs fraudulent scheme because he unwittingly used inappro-
priate comparable sales data provided by Mahmood in his appraisal 
of the subject property. 
Plaintiff did present evidence in opposition to the sum-
mary judgment motion which raised an issue as to whether Mahmood 
provided comparable sales data to Jackman. When questioned dur-
ing the trial of the case entitled Mahmood v. Jensen, Mahmood 
testified that he "assisted Mr. Jackman, much to my recollection, 
in—and some of the market data that I had in my file." 
(R. 245-246) 
In that same case, Galen Ross, an officer of National 
Housing, testified that National Housing paid Mahmood approxi-
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mately $200,000 of National Housing's profits on the sale and 
that Mahmood gave Ross 50% of what National Housing paid him, 
(R. 242-24 3) That evidence certainly creates a triable issue of 
material fact as to whether a civil conspiracy existed between 
Mahmood and National Housing, acting through its officers. See, 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1987). 
E. 
A FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD ON THE PART OF DEFENDANTS 
MAHMOOD AND NATIONAL HOUSING WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY DECLINED 
IN VALUE AFTER THE SALE TO PLAINTIFF 
A substantial portion of National Housing's memorandum 
in support of its summary judgment motion, and supporting 
evidence, was devoted to showing that extraneous factors caused 
the value of the subject property to fall subsequent to its sale 
to plaintiff. National Housing argued, first, that in 1981 Salt 
Lake County enacted the "Salt Lake County Hillside Ordinance" 
which resulted in a portion of the property being unavailable for 
development, thereby decreasing the value of the property. 
Second, National Housing argued that "following the sale, real 
estate values in general fell." (R. 181) 
Assuming those arguments to be valid does not preclude 
a finding that Mahmood and National Housing defrauded plaintiff 
by failing to disclose material facts which they had a duty to 
disclose, disclosure of which would have influenced plaintiff's 
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decision to purchase the property at the price actually paid. 
Proof of those facts may cause the trier of fact to conclude that 
plaintiff's damages are less, perhaps even grossly less, than 
plaintiff claims. But even irrefutable evidence that the value 
of the property dropped after the sale to plaintiff does not pre-
clude as a matter of law the possibility that Mahmood defrauded 
plaintiff by failing to disclose his business interest in Bara 
Investment Corporation, that he was going to share in National 
Housing's profits from the sale, that he had provided misleading 
comparable sales data to Jackman, and that he knew the property 
was worth less than plaintiff was going to pay. 
For example, assume that when National Housing paid 
$320,000 for the property and resold it to plaintiff for $927,000 
it in fact had a fair market value of $917,000. If plaintiff can 
prove the allegations of the sixth cause of action of its 
proposed Second Amended Complaint, as detailed in paragraphs (a) 
through (j) on pages 18 through 20 of this brief, then plaintiff 
would still have sustained damages of $10,000 by reason of 
Mahmoodfs fraud; the difference between the price actually paid 
for the property and the price plaintiff would have been willing 
to pay had Mahmood disclosed all the material facts. See, Lynch 
v. McDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464, 470 (1962); Dugan v. 
Jones, supra, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247. 
In short, the probative effect of the evidence presented 
by National Housing that the value of the property fell after the 
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sale goes only to the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff, 
but is irrelevant to the question of whether defendants committed 
a fraud. 
P. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT A BAR TO 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
Neither side disputes that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) 
sets forth the applicable statute of limitations on plaintiff's 
claims of fraud. That section states: 
"Within three years: 
"(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake; except that the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts con-
stituting the fraud or mistake." 
Discovery by the aggrieved party occurs when the fraud 
is discovered by the injured person, Esponda v. Ogden State Bank, 
75 Utah 117, 283 P. 729, 731 (1929), or perhaps when facts arise 
which would put a reasonably prudent person on notice to inquire 
into the matter. See, Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah 
1984). Whichever the standard, the time of "discovery" of fraud 
is a question of fact. Horn v. Daniel, 315 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 
1962) . 
In the instant case, National Housing argued to the 
trial court that plaintiff should have been put on notice to 
inquire when two years after the purchase of the property, in 
January 1982, plaintiff had the property appraised and the 
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appraisal showed the land to be worth $510,000, just 55% of the 
purchase price, National Housing argued that "such an enormous 
difference between price and appraised value would certainly 
place a reasonably prudent person on notice to inquire into the 
matter-" (R. 188) 
National Housing's argument might have some credibility 
were it not for the evidence, propounded by National Housing, 
that subsequent to plaintiff's purchase of the property the prop-
erty sustained a loss of value due to (1) enactment of the "Salt 
Lake County Hillside Ordinance", precluding construction on 
slopes exceeding a 40% grade, and (2) a general decline in the 
value of real estate in the years immediately following the 
purchase- If National Housing's contentions in that regard are 
true, there is no reason why plaintiff should have been placed on 
notice that a fraud may have been perpetrated merely by reason of 
a drop in the value of the property. 
In response to National Housing's summary judgment 
motion, plaintiff presented evidence (R. 249-251) that it did not 
have notice of possible fraudulent conduct until at least January 
1984 when William P. Chipman, an investment officer in 
plaintiff's Real Estate Department, first learned that Mahmood 
and National Housing had participated in a "double closing" and 
subsequently received copies of portions of transcripts of testi-
mony of Mahmood and National Housing officer Galen Ross given in 
the trial of Mahmood v. Jensen, Civil No. C83-4217. Those tran-
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scripts were not received until August and October, 1984. It was 
only after review of those transcripts that plaintiff had any 
knowledge whatsoever that it may have been victimized by Mahmood 
and National Housing. Plaintiff's original Complaint was filed 
on December 11, 1985, well within three years of January 1984.7 
The evidence presented was sufficient to create a 
triable issue of material fact as to when facts constituting the 
fraud were or should have been discovered, thus triggering the 
limitation period for an action based on fraud. While the trial 
court's minute order granting the summary judgment motion (R. 
269) does not specifically address the statute of limitation 
issue, if the Court found as a matter of law that the limitation 
period had expired, then it erred in so finding. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on all of the above, and on the record below, 
plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court erred when it 
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant National Housing. 
Based on the trial court's minute order granting the summary 
judgment motion, it would have been futile to oppose the summary 
judgment motion served on plaintiff by defendant Mahmood which 
7Plaintiff does not anticipate any argument that the proposed 
Second Amended Complaint, had it been allowed, would not have 
related back to the date of filing of the original Complaint. 
The proposed Second Amended Complaint added no new parties and 
the proposed new cause of action "arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth...in the original pleading." 
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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incorporated National Housing's arguments [see Footnote 4, 
supra] 
Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board submits that the 
judgments in favor of defendants National Housing and Badi 
Mahmood should be reversed and the case should be remanded to the 
trial court for trial. 
Plaintiff should be awarded its costs on appeal. 
DATED this ^A day of February, 1988. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Bv; yj&A^y^^ 
Craig T. Vincefit, 
Henry S. Nygaard, 
Steven H. Lybbert, Attorneys 
for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Utah State Retirement Board 
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ADDENDUM 
Proposed Second Amended Complaint (R. 157-170) 
May 13, 1987 Minute Order (R. 269) 
Judgment [in favor of National Housing] (R. 270-271) 
Motion for Summary Judgment [by Badi Mahmood] (not filed) 
Order [summary judgment in favor of Mahmood] (R. 272) 
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CRAIG T. VINCENT, ESQ. #3334 
HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. #2435 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
MARK A. MADSEN, ESQ. #2051 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, : 
PROPOSED 
Plaintiff, : SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
vs. : 
BADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE, : 
DALE JACKMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING 
AND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and : Civil No. C85-8322 
DOES 1 through 10, 
: Judge: James S. Sawaya 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff complains of defendants and for cause of 
action alleges: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. That plaintiff is an agency of the State of Utah 
created pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 49-9-1 et. seq. with its 
principal offices located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That defendant Badi Mahmood ("Mahmood") is and was 
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at all times referred to hereafter, a licensed real estate broker 
and appraiser residing in and doing business in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and is and was the principal broker for defendant 
Bara Investment Corporation. 
3. That defendant Irene Woodside ("Woodside") was at 
all times referred to hereafter a licensed real estate agent 
employed by or otherwise associated with defendant Bara Investment 
Corporation. 
4. That Dale Jackman (wJackman") is and was at all 
times referred to hereafter a real estate appraiser doing business 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. That defendant Bara Investment Corporation ("Bara") 
is a Utah corporation, with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which was involuntarily dissolved 
for failure to pay taxes on September 30, 1984. 
6. That defendant National Housing and Finance 
Syndicate ("National Housing") is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. That defendants Does 1 through 10 are individuals or 
entities not yet identified by plaintiff, but which were involved 
in the transaction which is the basis of this lawsuit, and which 
plaintiff intends to identify through discovery. 
8. That this lawsuit arises out of a sale of real pro-
perty ("the real property") consisting of approximately forty-six 
(46) acres located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more speci-
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fically described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point which is 1004.27 feet West, 
more or less, to a point on the East line of Lot 
38, GOLDEN HILLS NO. 14, and South 22*10' West 
179.16 feet from the calculated center of Section 
1, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 70Ml1 East 
1549.04 feet, along a line being Southerly 109.88 
feet and parallel to the Northerly line of Blue 
Jay Mining Claim No. 4988; thence North 16MO1 
East 744.19 feet, along said Easterly line and 
along the Easterly line of the Shaffer Mining 
Claim No. 3038, to the Northeasterly corner of the 
Shaffer Mining Claim No. 3038; thence North 75#37f 
West 621.95 feet along the Northerly line of said 
claim to a point on the center line of said 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, thence 
North 0*17f23" East 303.74 feet along said center 
line to a point of intersection with the Southerly 
line of the Repeat Mining Claim No. 4341; thence 
North 18•00' East 621.39 feet along said line to 
the most Easterly corner of said mining claim; 
thence North 53*34' West 234.08 feet along the 
North line of said Repeat Mining claim No. 4341 to 
a point of intersection with the center line of 
said section; thence North 0*17'23" East 84.93 
feet along said center line; thence along the 
Southerly line of Golden Hills Canyon, the 
following 6 courses; North 75* West 87.22 feet; 
thence North 85* West 232.19 feet; thence South 
58* West 131.75 feet; thence North 75*04f53" West 
227.68 feet; thence Southwesterly along a 149.984 
foot radius curve to the right through a central 
angle of 68*04f53" a distance of 178.22 feet; 
thence South 83" West 61.20 feet to a point on the 
East line of Golden Hills No. 7, a subdivision; 
thence South 7* East 187.28 feet along said East 
side; thence South 27* West 331.437 feet; thence 
South 63" East 24.476 feet; thence South 27* West 
130.0 feet; thence North 63" West 37.14 feet; 
thence South 13#10' East 372.63 feet; thence South 
along the East line of Lot 40, Golden Hills No. 14 
112.59 feet; thence South 22-10' West 346.47 feet 
to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO and together with the following 
described 66 foot right of way over and across the 
South line of the property described above, which 
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right of way is not to limit ingress and egress to 
either party which is a part of this agreement 
herewith heirs or assigns and successors in 
interest until such time as access is established 
of record between the parties hereto. 
It is further agreed that access shall be 
established from a street known as Kings Hill 
Drive. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
9. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 8 and incorporates the same herein. 
10. That plaintiff and National Housing entered into an 
Earnest Money Contract for the purchase of the real property 
described in paragraph 8 above, on December 18, 1979, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein. 
11. That National Housing's interest in the property at 
the time of the contract was limited to an option to purchase the 
same. 
12. That National Housing exercised its option and 
purchased the property on January 2, 1980, for the amount of 
$320,000.00, which amount represents the actual value of the pro-
perty at that time, and defendant National Housing closed the sale 
to the plaintiff on that same day for an amount of $927,819.00 
($20,000.00 per acre), thereby realizing an instantaneous gain of 
$607,819.00. 
13. That the purchase price agreed to by the plaintiff 
was based on an appraisal done by Jackman, which value was erro-
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neous. 
14. That plaintiff did not know of the erroneous nature 
of the appraisal. 
15. That National Housing knew of the erroneous nature 
of the appraisal, and further knew that plaintiff did not know 
of the erroneous nature of the appraisal. 
16. That National Housing had a duty to inform the 
plaintiff of its interest in the land and the nature and extent of 
the mistake. 
17. That National Housing knew or should have known that 
plaintiff relied upon the erroneous appraisal and the integrity of 
the defendant National Housing to be fair and honest in its busi-
ness dealings. 
18. That as a direct result of plaintiff's mistake and 
National Housing's knowledge thereof, plaintiff has been damaged 
in the amount of $607,819.00. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
MISREPRESENTATION 
19. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 18 and incorporates the same herein. 
20. The defendants Mahmoodf Woodside and Bara were bro-
kers/agents in the sale from National Housing to plaintiff, and 
were instrumental in arranging and negotiating the sale, and that 
because of their legal relationships of principal and agent, each 
is liable for the acts of the other. 
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21. Plaintiff arranged for an appraisal from Jackman but 
unknown to plaintiff, Mahmood dealt directly with Jackman and 
either supplied Jackman with the comparables relied upon in said 
appraisal, or actually drafted the appraisal for Jackman, and 
Mahmood was therefore instrumental in arriving at the erroneous 
value stated in the appraisal. 
22. That Mahmood, Woodside and Bara misrepresented the 
value of the property to the plaintiff and that said misrepresen-
tation constitutes a misrepresentation of a material fact. 
23. That Mahmood, Woodside and Bara knew of National 
Housing's opportunity to purchase the property for $320,000.00, 
and further knew that $320,000.00 constituted the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the sale to plaintiff. 
24. That the misrepresentation was made with the intent 
to deceive plaintiff as to the value of the property and induce 
plaintiff to act thereon. 
25. That plaintiff did not discover the misrepresen-
tation and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time 
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the 
underlying facts alleged herein. 
26. That plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepre-
sentation and as a result of plaintiff's reliance, plaintiff has 
been damaged in the amount of $607,819.00. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD 
27. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
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through 26 and incorporates the same herein. 
28. That National Housing, by and through its agents and 
officers, misrepresented the value of the property to plaintiff, 
and that said misrepresentation constitutes a misrepresentation of 
a material fact. 
29. That National Housing knew the value of the property 
was $320,000.00. 
30. That the misrepresentation was made with the intent 
to deceive plaintiff and induce plaintiff to act thereon. 
31. That plaintiff did not discover the misrepresen-
tation and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time 
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the 
underlying facts alleged herein. 
32. That plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepre-
sentation and as a result of plaintifffs reliance, plaintiff has 
been damaged in the amount of $607,819.00. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD 
33. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 32 and incorporates the same herein. 
34. That Jackman misrepresented the value of the pro-
perty to the plaintiff, and that said misrepresentation constitu-
tes a misrepresentation of a material fact. 
35. That the value of the property arrived at by Jackman 
-7-
was based either on comparables supplied to Jackman by Mahmood 
which were not accurate comparables, or on a completed appraisal 
submitted to Jackman by Mahmood for signature only, and that 
Jackman failed to accurately and independently conduct his own 
research. 
36. That Jackman knew of the purchase by National 
Housing of the property for $320,000.00, but failed to disclose 
the same. 
37. That Jackmanfs representation of the value of the 
property at $950,000.00 was made either with intent to defraud the 
plaintiff, or was recklessly made. 
38. That Jackman knew that plaintiff would rely on the 
appraisal, and the value stated therein. 
39. That plaintiff did not discover the misrepresen-
tation and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time 
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the 
underlying facts alleged herein. 
40. That plaintiff justifiably relied on the value of 
the property as represented by the appraisal and as a result of 
plaintiff's reliance, plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of 
$607,819.00. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
CONSPIRACY 
41. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 40 and incorporates the same herein. 
-8-
42. That each of the defendants knew the value of the 
property at the time of sale to the plaintiff was $320,000.00. 
43. That the defendants conspired and acted in concert 
to defraud the plaintiff as to the value of the property, and 
thereby cause injury to the plaintiff. 
44. That the defendants overtly carried out their 
conspiracy by concealing the true nature of National Housing's 
interest in the property, by concealing the true value of the pro-
perty, by providing a misleading and erroneous appraisal, by con-
cealing Mahmoodfs interest in Bara Investment, and by 
misrepresenting the value of the property to the plaintiff. 
45. That the conspiracy referred to in paragraph 43, 
combined with the acts referred to in paragraph 44, defrauded the 
plaintiff causing injury to the plaintiff in the amount of 
$607,819.00. 
46. That after receiving the cash sale proceeds from the 
plaintiff, National Housing paid Mahmood $200,000.00 for his part 
in the conspiracy, and Mahmood in turn paid an individual officer 
of National Housing $100,000.00. 
47. That plaintiff did not discover the conspiracy to 
defraud and had no reasonable opportunity to do so until some time 
after January, 1984, when it began to be apprised of the 
underlying facts alleged herein. 
48. As a direct result of the defendants' conspiratorial 
acts, the plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $607,819.00. 
-9-
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
49. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 48 and incorporates the same herein. 
50. Defendants Mahmood, Woodside and National Housing 
committed constructive fraud upon the plaintiff: 
a. The defendants failed to disclose their true 
relationship with each other when they each knew that a 
conflict of interest existed and that as a direct result 
of said relationship and conflict of interest coupled 
with their unique knowledge concerning the transaction 
in question, that they were not entitled to the 
unconscionable profit realized from the transaction. 
b. Mahmood failed to disclose that he had a 
controlling interest in Bara Investment, the brokerage 
firm that handled this sales transaction. 
o. Mahmood failed to disclose that at the time he 
recommended that Dale Jackman appraise the property in 
question, that he or his agent Woodside, through Bara 
Investment, he provided the real estate comparable to 
other information to Jackman which resulted in an erro-
neous and accessibly high appraisal. 
d. That the party defendants acted in concert to 
defraud the plaintiff and obtain an unreasonable and 
unconscionable profit by closing the real estate tran-
-10-
saction between National Housing and Golden Hills Land 
Corporation at Associated Title on the 2nd day of 
January, 1980, and January 3, 1980, executed a resale of 
said property from National Housing to the plaintiff. 
Said double closing was never disclosed to the plain-
tiff. 
e. The conflict of interest is in direct violation 
of i 61-2-11(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 16, & 17), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended. 
f. Subsequent to the transaction, Mahmood falsely 
represented that his brokerage company did not handle 
the transaction and that the sale was the result of a 
direct negotiation between National Housing and counsel 
for plaintiff. 
g. At the time the Earnest Money Contract dated 
December 18, 1979, was executed, Irene Woodside signed 
as a real estate agent for Bara Investment; no disclo-
sure was made that Mahmood controlled Bara Investment. 
h. The defendants failed to disclose that Mahmood 
had a personal and business interest in National Housing 
and that they, by prior arrangement, acted in concert to 
resell said land to the plaintiff and then agreeing to 
divide their unconscionable profit among themselves; 
National Housing and Mahmood knowingly used Mahmood1s 
close personal and business connections with the plain-
-11-
tiff to secure said profit at the plaintiff's expense, 
i. The defendants failed to disclose that they each 
had actual knowledge of the market value of said pro-
perty and actually saw the Jackman appraisal before the 
December 18, 1979, Earnest Money Agreement was executed, 
j. Their representations were false. 
k. Their representations or omissions concerned a 
presently existing material facts* 
1, Their representations and/or omissions to 
disclose material facts were made to induce plaintiff to 
execute the contracts consummating the transaction. 
m. Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of 
the falsity of their representations and/or omissions. 
n. The defendants had a duty to disclose all of the 
material facts and possible conflicts of interest before 
the transactions were consummated on or about the 2nd 
day of January, 1980, knowing the plaintiff had no 
knowledge of the true facts and was relying upon the 
representations (or failure to disclose information) of 
the defendants. 
o. Plaintiff relied upon the defendants1 represen-
tations or omissions in executing the contracts. 
p. Plaintiff suffered damages as a direct result of 
the fraudulent acts and omissions of the defendants. 
-12-
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
51. Plaintiff realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 50 and incorporates the same herein. 
52. That the above-described conduct of the defendants 
was intentional, wilful, and malicious. 
53. That the defendants knew that their conduct would 
result in substantial harm to the plaintiff, and said conduct was 
done with reckless indifference and disregard of plaintiff's 
rights. 
54. That plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to punitive 
damages in the amount of $1,200,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for a judgment against defen-
dants and each of them in the amount of $607,819.00 together with 
punitive damages in the amount of $1,200,000.00, interest, costs 
of court, attorney's fees and such other relief as the court deems 
just. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mark A. Madsen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Gordon Campbell, A0554 
Mark L. Mathie, A4880 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT 
V. ) 
BADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE, ) 
DALE JACKMAN, BARA INVESTMENT ) Civil No. C85-8322 
CORPORATION, NATIONAL HOUSING ) 
AND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and ) 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, ) 
) Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendants. ) 
On May 13, 1987, the Court heard argument on defendant 
National Housing and Finance Syndicate's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and plaintiff's motion to file its second amended 
complaint. The Court, having reviewed the motions, memoranda and 
all supporting documents, and being fully advised of the matters 
at issue and good cause appearing therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and 
plaintiff's action against it is dismissed with prejudice. 
0oo<'° 
Jim H TO J S W H S ! 
plaintiff's Motion to File Its Second Amended Complaint is denied 
for the reason that the Motion is moot in light of the Court's 
ruling on the aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this /) day of June^l^87. 
Uy—J*UA ^ ry /v I / v
 f\ 
ATTEST ( / * yCfar^. 
H. DIXON HINDLEV-. \ ^ ^ — — 
QI^ District- Judge 
CERTIPI^i^Q^ SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this <~>VAv" day of June 1987, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Craig T. Vincent, Esq. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq. 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Mark A. Madsen, Esq. 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Brant Wall, Esq. 
Wall & Wall 
9 Exchange Place 
Suite 900, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lowell V. Summerhays, Esq. 
Tamara J. Hauge, Esq. 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
V ^ VyCXrvvvxJU VAjVvvXAvQi i 
GWC:052787B §TAT*0PUT*f )m 
COUNTY Of SALT UKE ) * * 
I, ?W| UWBWMGNgD. CLERK OF THE DtSTRJCT 
eouar OF S^T LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY 
CERTIFY THA* THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING 13 
- 2 - A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU-
MENT ON FILE \H MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK 
WITNESS MY HAND AND^SEA^OF SAID COURT 
THIS ? * DAY OF (V*** 19 JjjL^rl^ 
H DIXON, HINDJ.EY, CLERK , - Q U v J *%' 
BY A r v ^ l ^ u ^ g AA-A.^ DEPUTY 
BRANT H. WALL, NO, 3364 
WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
(UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IBADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE, 
DALE JACKMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING 
RND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and 
pOES 1 THROUGH X, 
Defendants• 
MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-85-8322 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
) 
M.MAPC) 
'S AT LAW 
TON BUILDING 
TV UT 8 4 m 
•18220 
COMES NOW the Defendant Badi Mahmood, pursuant to Rule 56, 
btah Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby moves the Court fori 
Summary Judgment and that this action be dismissed for the reason 
that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the! 
Defendant Badi Mahmood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This Motion is based upon the pleadings on file, the depositions of| 
Russell Hales and William Chipman and the exhibits attached] 
thereto. 
Defendant adopts by reference the Memorandum of Points and| 
Authorities heretofore filed by the Defendant National Housing and| 
Finance Syndicate, together with the arguments previously presented 
to the Court pursuant to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
-2-
|said National Housing and Finance Syndicate in which this Defendant 
(participated. 
DATED this //) day of June, 1987 
l WALL (A P C ) 
*NEYS AT LAW 
BOSTON BUILDING 
£ CITY UT 84111 
1)521 8220 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
. WALtr 
torney for Defendant Mahmood 
NT H 
HENRY S. NYGAARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the) 
[foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following persons,] 
|this ^ Q^)^day of June, 1987: 
Henry S. Nygaard 
Attorney at Law 
330 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Mark A. Madsen 
Attorney at Law 
540 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Gordon Campbell 
Attorney at Law 
215 South State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney at Law 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Secretary to Brant H. Wall 
ALL (A PC) 
Y$ AT LAW 
;TON BUILCXNG 
ITY UT 84111 
?1 8220 
JAttorney for Defendant Mahmood 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Bait Lake City, Utah 84111 
telephone: (801) 521-8220 
JJTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
bADI MAHMOOD, IRENE WOODSIDE, 
DALE JACKMAN, NATIONAL HOUSING 
AND FINANCE SYNDICATE, and 
pOES 1 THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER 
Civil No. C-85-8322 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
) 
BASED UPON Stipulation dated June 30, 1987, by and between 
bounsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant Badi Mahmood, and thej 
Motion of counsel for the Defendant Badi Mahmood dated June 18, 
p.987, and the Court having duly considered the record and all 
matters referred to in said Stipulation, and being thus fully) 
(advised in the premises, 
DOES HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGE, AND DECREE that Defendant Badi 
Mahmood's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted andj 
plaintiff's action against him is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's Motion to File Its Second Amended Complaint is denied 
tor the reason that the Motion is moot in light of the Court's! 
(ruling on the aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment. 
000*'*' 
WALL & WALL (A P C ) 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
E 600 BOSTON BUILDING 
.T LAKE CITY UT 84111 
(801) S21 6220 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
AND CONTENT: 
DATED this / ^ day of July, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
DIstRlCT COURT JUDGE ^ 
ATTEST 
H. OIXON HII 
k.* fAt 
TsTTr? 
f^ 
HENRYi/S. NYGAARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
[foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following named 
persons this day of July, 1987: 
Mr. Mark A. Madsen 
Attorney at Law 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Mr. Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney at Law 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mr. Gordon Campbell 
Attorney at Law 
215 South State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary to Brant H. Wall 
ooo*tf 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 5 ^ day of February, 1988, 
I personally hand delivered copies of APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
in the case of Utah State Retirement Board v. Badi Mahmood and 
National Housing and Finance Syndicate, Case No. 870375, to the 
following: 
Brant H. Wall 
Wall & Wall 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (4 copies) 
Warren Patten 
Mark L. Mathie 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (4 copies) 
/Jfitni\l«hii 
Steven H. Lyobert 
f-
